Agins v. City of Tiburon: The Case of the Frustrated Landowner by Copley, Jan E.
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
Volume 13 Number 1 Article 5 
12-1-1979 
Agins v. City of Tiburon: The Case of the Frustrated Landowner 
Jan E. Copley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jan E. Copley, Agins v. City of Tiburon: The Case of the Frustrated Landowner, 13 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 157 
(1979). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol13/iss1/5 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ 
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law 
School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. 
A GINS V CITY OF TIBURON: THE CASE OF
THE FRUSTRATED LANDOWNER
The less pleasant aspects of urban life, such as smoke, noise, and
congestion, have created a general desire to relegate the sources of
these inconveniences to areas removed from those where people live
and play. An increasing national awareness that the physical and aes-
thetic resources of the country are finite and must be preserved has
prompted governmental entities to balance the need for industry and
adequate housing with the requirement that we maintain our country
as a pleasant place in which to live.
One of the mechanisms developed to deal with land use control is
the zoning of designated areas of land for specific uses. ' Implicit in the
zoning process is the balancing of the constitutionally protected rights
of the private property owner with the public need to regulate land
use.
2
by restricting the rights of all property owners, each will bene-
fit. Each landowner relinquishes some property right for the
good of the social whole. The only compensation given to the
landowner is a pro rata benefit in the form of nuisance protec-
tions, reciprocal control over neighboring land uses and prop-
erty value stablization?
Such zoning was declared constitutionally valid in 1926 by the United
States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.' and is
now accepted in every jurisdiction in this country.' Confficts still arise,
however, when landowners are confronted with particularly restrictive
1. See Bowden, Article XXVIII-Opening The Door To Open Space Control, 1 PAC.
L.J. 461, 466-92 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bowden]. The subject of Bowden's article was
repealed on November 5, 1974. CAL. CONST. art. 28 (West 1978). A legislative section on
open space zoning has since been added to CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65910-65912 (West Supp.
1966-1979). Bowden emphasizes that zoning is a flexible exercise of the police power, which
expands and contracts on the basis of social necessity. Bowden, supra, at 473. Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979),prob.juris. noted, 100 S.
Ct. 658 (1980), is an example of that flexibility; zoning ordinances were not originally cre-
ated for the purpose of preserving aesthetic values. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381
(1925).
2. Bowden, supra note 1, at 472. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926); McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954), where such balancing tests were used.
3. Bowden, supra note 1, at 501.
4. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
5. See Bowden, supra note 1 at 471; Comment, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberra-
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zoning ordinances.' Property owners have often brought actions for
damages in inverse condemnation 7 with alternative requests for declar-
atory relief to invalidate the oppressive ordinance as an abuse of the
police power.' Other owners, while acknowledging the validity of a
particular zoning ordinance, have sought damages in inverse condem-
nation.9 In 1977, two California courts of appeal dealt with the meth-
ods of challenging restrictive zoning ordinances and reached conflicting
results. In Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 0 the plaintiffs challenged an
ordinance that placed their land in a permanent open space classifica-
tion limiting the land to ten acres per homesite. The court held that,
although valid, the ordinance was so restrictive as to create a valid
tion or New Direction in Land Use Law? 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1570 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Aberration].
6. See, e.g., Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (ordinance
upheld that discriminated against low income groups); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of
Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (lst Cir. 1972) (minimum lot size increased); HFH, Ltd. v. Supe-
rior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904
(1976) (rezoning upheld even though it caused substantial reduction in value); Pinheiro v.
County of Marin, 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976) (upheld open space zoning
that caused diminution in value).
7. Inverse condemnation refers to a cause of action against a governmental entity to
recover the value of property that has in effect been appropriated by the government without
prior compensation. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [herein-
after cited as Sax]; Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power. The Searchfor In-
verse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1971); Comment, Inverse Condemnation:
Its Availability in Challenging the Vaiidity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439
(1974).
8. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 513-14, 542 P.2d 237, 240-41,
125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 368-69 (1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) (remedy of inverse con-
demnation denied on mere allegation of loss of property value); State v. Superior Court
(Veta), 12 Cal. 3d 234, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974) (remedy of inverse condem-
nation denied following the denial of a permit by the Coastal Zone Conservation Commis-
sion); Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 119, 514 P.2d 111, 116-
17, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 804 (1973) (denial of allegation of inverse condemnation based on
municipality's adoption of a general plan).
Cases in which the remedy of inverse condemnation was upheld: Klopping v. City of
Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 45-46, 500 P.2d 1345, 1350-51, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6-7 (1972) (city held
liable for just compensation because of unreasonable pre-condemnation activity); Eldridge
v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 628-29, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575, 584 (1976) (action for
inverse condemnation sustained because no remaining reasonable use of property); Peacock
v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969) (height zoning
ordinance passed in anticipation of need of acquisition of air navigation easement); Sneed v.
County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 209, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318, 322 (1963) (height zoning
ordinance passed in lieu of eminent domain acquisition of air navigation easement); Kis-
singer v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 462-63, 327 P.2d 10, 16-17 (1958) (zon-
ing for purpose of depressing property value prior to public acquisition).
9. See, e.g., Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 617, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575,
577 (1976).
10. Id.
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cause of action in inverse condemnation. 1 However, in Pinheiro v.
County of Marin,12 which also involved an open space classification,
the court rejected the inverse condemnation claim and held that the
only remedy available to an aggrieved landowner is an action in man-
damus to have the ordinance in question invalidated.
1 3
The California Supreme Court attempted to resolve this conflict in
Agins v. City of Tiburon. 4 The Agins court held that a property owner
may challenge the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance by establish-
ing its invalidity through mandamus or declaratory relief. 5 The court
expressly held that a landowner may not challenge a land use regula-
tion on the theory of inverse condemnation and therefore disapproved
Eldridge.
16
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
In Agins, Donald and Bonnie Agins had acquired five acres of
land along Tiburon Ridge in Main County. 7 The property was hill-
side land with a view of the San Francisco Bay; it was purchased by
plaintiffs for housing development purposes.
1 8
California Government Code sections 6530011 and 65302(a)20 re-
quire that all California municipalities draw up a general plan specify-
ing land use zones. Under the authority of these statutes, Tiburon
11. Id. at 629, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
12. 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
13. Id. at 327, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
14. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), prob. juris noted, 100 S. Ct.
658 (1980).
15. Id. at 270, 598 P.2d at 26, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
16. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
17. Id. at 270, 598 P.2d at 26, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
18. Id.
19. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300 (West 1966) provides that "[e]ach planning agency shall
prepare and the legislative body of each county and city shall adopt a comprehensive, long-
term general plan for the physical development of the county or city."
20. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302 (West 1966 & Supp. 1966-1979) requires:
The general plan shall consist of a statement of development policies and shall
include a diagram or diagrams and text setting forth objectives, principles, stan-
dards, and plan proposals. The plan shall include the following elements:
(a) A land use element which designates the proposed general distribution
and general location and extent of the uses of the land for housing, business, indus-
try, open space, including agriculture, natural resources, recreation, and enjoyment
of scenic beauty, education, public buildings and grounds, solid and liquid waste
disposal facilities, and other categories of public and private uses of land. The land
use element shall include a statement of the standards of population density and
building intensity recommended for the various districts and other territory cov-
ered by the plan.
1979]
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adopted Ordinance No. 124 N.S., which went into effect in June 197321
and which contained widespread zoning modifications. Part of the
plan designated areas to be kept as "open space." The city council au-
thorized the sale of bonds to acquire such lands through an eminent
domain action.
22
Although no mention of plaintiffs' land was made when the bonds
were approved, Tiburon's general plan designated the Agins' property
as part of the area to be used for open space. More specifically, the
land was zoned RPD-1, defined in Ordinance No. 123 N.S. as "Resi-
dential Planned Development and Open Space Zone."23 The only au-
thorized uses of land in this zoning area were single-family dwellings,
open space uses, and accessory buildings and uses. Permissible build-
ing density in the area was very low: "'not less than .2 nor more than
one dwelling per gross acre depending on other specified provisions,"
such as architectural plans and recommendations of a required envi-
ronmental impact report.24 Because the plaintiffs owned five acres,
they could have built, under the terms of the zoning ordiance, a mini-
mum of one or a maximum of five dwelling units on their land.25
The Aginses failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.26
They neither submitted to the city a plan of proposed uses of the prop-
erty nor sought a definitive statement from the city on the type of land
uses allowed them after Tiburon adopted its general plan. By so doing,
they lost any chance to compromise with the city on permissible uses of
their land. Instead, they filed a claim for $2,000,000 in damages against
Tiburon in October 1973, alleging that the zoning regulations had com-
pletely destroyed the value of their property.27 Their claim was re-
jected by the city.
In December 1973, Tiburon brought an action in eminent domain
against the Aginses that was abandoned by the city in November 1974
and dismissed by the trial court in June 1975.28 The city paid the plain-
tiffs for legal expenses incurred by them during the pendency of the
action pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section
21. 24 Cal. 3d at 271, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
22. Id. at 270-71, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
23. Id. at 271, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
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1255a(c).29 The remedy was exclusive; the Agins had no further cause
of action against Tiburon arising out of the abandoned eminent do-
main proceedings.3"
Finding themselves the owners of land with severely restricted
uses, the Aginses filed an action in superior court in June 1975 against
the City of Tiburon seeking damages in inverse condemnation and de-
claratory relief on the theory that Tiburon's ordinance was an unconsti-
tutional taking of their land without just compensation.' The city
demurred to both causes of action. The demurrer to the first cause of
action for damages in inverse condemnation was sustained without
leave to amend. Plaintiffs were given ten days to amend their second
cause of action for declaratory relief. They declined to do so, and the
trial court dismissed their action with prejudice. The Aginses then ap-
pealed from the dismissal.
32
II. REASONING OF THE COURT
4. Remedies
Agins presents two major issues. The first is whether Ordinance
No. 124 N.S. created a constitutionally invalid "taking" of the plain-
tiffs' property. Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court failed to
focus directly on this question; rather, it looked to the validity of the
challenged zoning ordinance. This raises the second major issue: what
remedies should be available to a landowner confronted with the
downzoning of his property? Here, the court made two holdings:
(1) the remedy of damages in inverse condemnation is not available
and (2) declaratory relief is available in a challenge to the facial valid-
ity of a zoning statute.33
In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to the holdings of pre-
vious California cases that dealt with the propriety of remedies avail-
able to a plaintiff alleging abuse of the police power.34 The first case
relied on by the court as precedent for its conclusion that declaratory
29. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255a(c) (West 1973) (superseded by CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1235.140, 1268.510(c) & 1268.610 (West 1978)).
30. 24 Cal. 3d at 271, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
31. Id. at 271-72, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374. The cause of action in inverse
condemnation carried with it a claim for $2,000,000 in damages. Id.
32. Id. at 272, 598 P.2d at 27-28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75.
33. Id. at 269-70, 598 P.2d at 26, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
34. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); State v. Superior Court (Veta), 12 Cal. 3d 234, 524
P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974); Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal.
3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
1979]
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relief is the only available remedy when a plaintiff seeks to have a land
use ordinance declared invalid was State v. Superior Court (Veta).35 In
Veta, two corporations (Veta) sought a permit to build on land within
the jurisdiction of the California Coastal Zone Commission. The per-
mit was denied.36 Veta then sought a declaration that the act under
which the Commission was operating was unconstitutional.37 The
court in Veta held that such relief was proper.38 According to theAgins
court, Veta stands for the proposition that "declaratory relief [is] an
appropriate remedy by which to seek a declaration that a statute con-
trolling development. . .[is] facially unconstitutional."
39
The Agins court also relied on the court of appeal decision of
Friedman v. City of Fairfax40 as authority for its holding.4' In that
case, a change in city zoning regulations frustrated the plaintiff's plans
to build multiple-family dwellings but allowed the existing uses of the
property to continue.42 The court of appeal held that no taking had
occurred.43 Friedman differs from Agins in that the land in Friedman
was already being used for profitable purposes, 4 while the land in
Agins was vacant. But, the court's holding in Friedman, that a zoning
35. 12 Cal. 3d 234, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974). Vea, however, was not
directly on point with the issues presented in Agins and was used by way of analogy. In
Veta, the real dispute was whether the permit had been properly withheld. The plaintiffs
did not directly challenge the validity of any statute or ordinance designed to control land
use; rather, they challenged the action of the Commission operating under a statute designed
to achieve land control. However, it is not difficult to conclude that a remedy available to
challenge an action of a governmental agency in the area of land use control should also be
available to challenge an ordinance that performs the same function. Hence, although Veta
does not directly deal with the issue of zoning by ordinance, the case does lend support to
the court's rationale in Agins.
36. Id. at 242-43, 524 P.2d at 1284, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
37. Id. at 244, 524 P.2d at 1285, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
38. Id. at 251, 524 P.2d at 1290, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
39. 24 Cal. 3d at 272-73, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
40. 81 Cal. App. 3d 667, 146 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1978).
41. 24 Cal. 3d at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375. Friedman is also not directly
on point but may be persuasive authority by analogy. In Friedman, the land in question was
already being used as a privately owned recreation area. The City of Fairfax passed a zon-
ing ordinance in which existing uses would be allowed to continue on the property. 81 Cal.
App. 3d at 672, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 690. Plaintiff, however, had found that his present use of
the land was growing unprofitable and made plans to sell the land for construction of multi-
ple-family dwellings; the new zoning regulation frustrated the implementation of his project.
Id. at 672-74, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 690-91. The plaintiff then brought an action in inverse
condemnation, alleging that the diminution in his property value constituted a taking; it was
denied on the basis that there was no compensable "taking." Id. at 672, 146 Cal. Rptr. at
690.
42. Id. at 672, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
43. Id. at 675-76, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 692-93.
44. Id. at 670, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
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regulation that restricts land to an existing use is valid, is not radically
different from a ruling that vacant land may properly be restricted to
narrowly specified purposes. In both situations the land in question
cannot be developed for newer, more profitable uses; yet, in both situa-
tions, the property still has some value and may be used for some pur-
pose. According to the rationale of Friedman, as long as the land in
question has some facially viable use, there will be no taking.
45
The cases of HFH, Ltd v. Superior Court4 6 and Pinheiro v. County
of Main47 are also factually similar to Agins and provide further sup-
port for the decision reached in Agins; the court failed, however, to rely
on them for the proposition that declaratory relief is an appropriate
remedy in challenges to zoning ordinances. In Pinheiro, the plaintiffs
suffered a loss very similar to that suffered by the Aginses; their land
was downzoned and designated as open space. They sued in inverse
condemnation.48 The court of appeal held that their complaint could
not lie because they had not alleged improper actions by Main County
in the zoning process4 9 or actual public use of the land that would give
rise to the complaint.
50
The facts of HFH were also similar to those of Agins: the plain-
tiffs suffered a substantial loss when their vacant property was
downzoned from commercial to single-family residential uses.51 They
sought relief in inverse condemnation on the theory that their financial
loss ($325,000)52 was so great that the zoning amounted to a "taking.
5 3
The California Supreme Court rejected the owners' argument on a two-
fold basis, holding that (1) mere allegations of financial loss are not
45. Id. at 675-76, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
46. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904
(1976).
47. 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
48. Id. at 325, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 634. The Pinheiro court did not specify the manner in
which the land was used before the ordinance was passed.
49. Id. at 327-28, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
50. Id. at 328, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
51. 15 Cal. 3d at 512, 542 P.2d at 240-41, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68. More specifically, the
plaintiffs, HFH, Ltd. and Von's Grocery Company, had purchased land in the City of Cer-
ritos upon the express condition that its zoning would be changed to commercial, apparently
with the intent to develop the area as a shopping center. The zoning was successfully up-
graded subsequent to purchase; but the plaintiffs let the land remain vacant for a period of
five years. The municipality then changed the applicable zoning ordinances, first to agricul-
tural, then to single-family residential. Id. at 520, 542 P.2d at 246, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
52. Id. at 512, 542 P.2d at 240, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368. Plaintiffs alleged that the market
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sufficient to give rise to an action in inverse condemnation 5 4 and (2) as
long as the land affected can be used for some purpose, that is, still has
some value, it has not been "taken" or "damaged" within the eminent
domain provisions of the California Constitution.
All of the issues raised in Agins were substantially covered by
Veta, HFH, Friedman and Pinheiro. Veta holds that declaratory relief
is the proper remedy in challenging a zoning ordinance. 6 HFH autho-
rizes that mere diminution in property value is insufficient to state a
cause of action in inverse condemnation. 7 Pinheiro denies damages in
a fact situation similar to that in Agins,5" and Friedman states that a
remaining profitable use of downzoned land defeats allegations of
"taking."59 These cases deal with all of the issues presented in Agins:
Friedman, Pinheiro and HFH dispose of the taking issue, and Vela
prescribes the appropriate remedy.
In HFH, however, the court added the following caveat: "This
case does not present, and we therefore do not decide, the questions of
entitlement to compensation in the event a zoning regulation forbade
substantially all use of the land in question. We leave the question for
another day.""0 The court in Agins specifically stated that it was ad-
dressing the issue left open by the caveat in HFH,61 but in fact the
court did not reach the issue of compensation when all use of the land
has been denied. Later in the opinion, when the court upheld the va-
lidity of Tiburon's disputed zoning ordinance, it stressed that one rea-
son the ordinance was valid was because it did not deprive the Aginses
of all use of their land.
62
Although the court in Agins held that no cause of action for in-
verse condemnation would lie against a zoning ordinance, the concept
of "taking" retains significance in such cases: "taking" defines the
point at which the ordinance exceeds the bounds of police power. The
54. Id. at 513-18, 542 P.2d at 240-44, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368-72.
55. Id. at 520-23, 542 P.2d at 244-48, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 373-76. HFH has received mixed
critical reactions. See 4berration, supra note 5; Note, Compensation for Loss in Property
Value Causedby Zoning: HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 426 (1977); Note,
HFH v. Superior Court-4nother Perspeetive on the Dilemma of/he Downzoned Property
Owner, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 440 (1977).
56. 12 Cal. 3d at 251, 524 P.2d at 1290, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
57. 15 Cal. 3d at 513-18, 542 P.2d at 240-44, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368-72.
58. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 325, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
59. 81 Cal. App. 3d at 675-76, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
60. 15 Cal. 3d at 518, n.16, 542 P.2d at 244, n.16, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372, n.16.
61. 24 Cal. 3d at 274, 598 P.2d at 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
62. Id. at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
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court therefore disapproved Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto,63 which had
given rise to much confusion concerning the effect of a restrictive, zon-
ing ordinance. In Eldridge, the City of Palo Alto had zoned its foothills
for open space, and plaintiffs, who had previously purchased part of the
area for development purposes, were unable to build upon their land as
they had planned.' They sued for damages in inverse condemnation.
The court in Eldridge relied on the caveat in HFH65 and concluded
that although a zoning ordinance may be valid,6 6 a landowner who suf-
fers an unreasonable injury from the zoning is entitled to bring an ac-
tion in inverse condemnation.67 Eldridge was "expressly disapproved"
by the Agins court.68
On the surface, the holding in Agins appears contrary to California
case law, which holds that damages are the only appropriate remedy in
inverse condemnation actions. 69 However, Agins is factually distin-
guishable from this previous line of authority. Agins involved a "regu-
latory" taking, that is, the plaintiffs alleged loss of their property
because of a land use regulation promulgated by a public entity. The
earlier cases, such as Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines
Inc.,7° allowing only the award of damages, differ in that they usually
involved taking actions sounding in tort. The general fact pattern in-
volved some public activity, not involving a regulation, undertaken in
the interest of the general welfare. The injured landowner usually
sought compensation and an injunction against the public entity by
way of relief7' but was limited to damages in inverse condemnation.72
63. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
64. Id. at 621, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
65. Id. at 618-19, 624, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 578, 581.
66. Id. at 631, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
67. Id. at 633, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 587. See Aberration, supra note 5, which discusses the
rationale of the Eldridge decision and how it is inconsistent with the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), and the
California Supreme Court's holding in HFH. The Eldridge decision was based on a federal
court decision, Arastra Ltd. v. Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated, 417 F.
Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976), dealing with an almost identical fact situation. Few decisions
have followed the holding in Eldridge; rather, most appellate decisions have attempted to
distinguish it. See, e.g., Helix Land Co. v. City of San Diego, 82 Cal. App. 3d 932, 942, 147
Cal. Rptr. 638, 688 (1978) (flood plain zoning claimed to be a "taking" of property).
68. 24 Cal. 3d at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
69. Loma Portal .Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 588, 394 P.2d
548, 552, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 712 (1964); Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d
677, 688, 76 P.2d 681, 687 (1938).
70. 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964).
71. See, e.g., id. at 594, 394 P.2d at 549-50, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 709; Hillside Water Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 677, 679, 76 P.2d 681, 682 (1938).
72. Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d at 588-89, 394 P.2d at
552, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
1979]
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The rationale underlying the courts' decisions in Agins and Loma
Portal is that the public interest is best served by limiting available
remedies.7 3 In regulatory taking actions - the Agins situation - the
courts have previously held that the public interest is best served by
limiting the plaintiffs to an action for declaratory relief.7 4 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court used the same rationale in its Loma Portal decision,
which limited damages to compensation:
public policy denies an injunction and permits only the recov-
ery of damages where private property has been put to a pub-
lic use . . . and the public has intervened . . . . This
principle is based on the policy of protecting the public inter-
est in the continuation of the use to which the property has
been pUt.
75
The Agins and Loma Portal decisions are consistent in their reliance on
the same policy considerations for limiting available remedies. The
difference in remedies is in turn attributable to the nature of the taking
to be redressed.
B. Constitutional Considerations
The court in Agins did not directly consider the issue of whether a
"taking" had been effected by the ordinance. 76 Instead, the court dis-
cussed the remedies available to plaintiffs in regulatory zoning actions
and then examined the facial validity of Tiburon's ordinance. By set-
ting up such an approach, the Agins court was able to circumvent the
taking issue, overruling Eldridge in the process.
The Eldridge court relied upon the United States Supreme Court
decision of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon77 in holding that inverse
condemnation is a viable cause of action against oppressive zoning reg-
ulations.78 The court in Eldridge based its holding on Mr. Justice
Holmes' statement that "while property may be regulated to a certain
73. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d at 275, 598 P.2d at 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376;
Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d at 588-89, 394 P.2d at 552, 39
Cal. Rptr. at 712.
74. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 520, 542 P.2d at 244-46, 125 Cal. Rptr. at
373-74.
75. 61 Cal. 2d at 588-89, 394 P.2d at 552, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
76. The Agins court merely held, in denying declaratory relief, that the regulation was
not unconstitutional on its face; it did not look to the effect of the zoning ordinance on the
Agins' land. 24 Cal. 3d at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
77. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
78. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 625-26, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
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extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 79
The Agins court dismissed the Eldridge interpretation of this language,
stating, "It is clear both from the context and the disposition in Mahon
• ..that the term 'taking' was used solely to indicate the limit by which
the acknowledged social goal of land control could be achieved by reg-
ulation rather than eminent domain."' 0 The court's statement might
have been less confusing had it explained that Mahon did not involve
inverse condemnation.
8'
In Mahon, the plaintiff (Mahon) brought suit to prevent the de-
fendant coal company from mining under his property in such a way as
to cause it to subside and asserted a Pennsylvania statute barring such
mining activities as a basis for his suit. The coal company replied that
the deed expressly reserved the underground coal and further released
the defendant from any liability that might occur because of the coal
company's mining activities. The coal company further asserted that
the statute in question was invalid as a limit on its freedom to contract
and a taking of its property without just compensation.
82
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the statute did
involve a taking and declared the regulation invalid. 3 Mahon was
"simply concerned with answering the threshold question whether or
not the act in question is a valid exercise of the police power. . . .The
act [was] simply invalidated by the Court, and the landowner [was] not
placed in the position of being able to require compensation from the
state .. "84 Compensation was not mentioned as a viable remedy in
Mahon because of the nature of the parties as private individuals.8
Therefore, the California Supreme Court's interpretation of Mahon
was correct; the Agins court merely failed to make its reasoning com-
pletely clear.
The Agins court failed to address adequately, however, the issue of
what constitutes compensable property damage in California. Article
1, section 19 of the California Constitution provides that "[p]rivate
property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just com-
pensation .. .has first been paid to ...the owner."86 California,
79. 260 U.S. at 415.
80. 24 Cal. 3d at 274, 598 P.2d at 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
81. 260 U.S. at 412.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 416.
84. Aberration, supra note 5, at 1575.
85. Id.
86. CAL. CONsT., art. 1, § 19. "Damage" is generally used to describe a physical impair-
ment of a landowner's property as a result of a public improvement. Holtz v. Superior
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then, theoretically provides for more extensive compensation than fed-
eral law; the fifth amendment only provides that property may not be
taken without just compensation. 7 The inverse condemnation action
in Agins was founded on both California and United States constitu-
tional provisions, and the California Supreme Court's rejection of the
Agins' claim implicitly involved the conclusion that neither a "taking"
nor a "damaging" had occurred. Unfortunately, the court failed to ex-
plain why it came to this conclusion; it merely concluded that "a zoning
ordinance may be unconstitutional and subject to invalidation only
when its effect is to deprive the landowner of substantially all reason-
able use of his property." 8
Implicit in the California Supreme Court's reasoning is the belief
that the police and eminent domain powers are mutually exclusive con-
cepts with separate remedies. This, then, is the basis of the holding in
Agins: because the plaintiffs were damaged as a result of a zoning ordi-
nance, traditionally considered an exercise of the police power, the
remedy of inverse condemnation-based on a state's power of eminent
domain and not its police power-is not available to them. 9 Rather,
the Aginses may only seek invalidation of the ordinance in question as
an abuse of Tiburon's police power.90
There is a logical consistency in the analysis of the California
courts that the police and eminent domain powers are bordering but
exclusive concepts; to admit otherwise would lead to the anomalous
conclusion reached in Eldridge, that an abuse of the police power
through excessive regulation, which deprives an individual of all use of
his land, is a valid exercise of governmental prerogatives. 91 Under the
logic of the California decisions, a valid regulation cannot also be
deemed abusive.92 By stating that declaratory relief is only available to
a property owner alleging loss of use of his property because of zoning,
the court has created a situation in which a landowner has no other
legal remedy: he may either hold on to the land and use it for its desig-
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 475 P.2d 441, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970); Reardon v. City of San Fran-
cisco, 66 Cal. 492, 6 P. 317 (1885).
87. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
88. 24 Cal. 3d at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
89. Id. at 275, 598 P.2d at 29-30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77.
90. Id. at 276-77, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
91. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 631, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 586.
92. This is the gist of the Agins decision: a landowner may only plead in declaratory
relief and many win only upon a showing that the regulation is invalid. Foreclosing the
remedy of inverse condemnation prohibits a landowner from proving that a valid ordinance
may be abusive as applied to him or her.
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nated, limited purposes, sell it at a greatly reduced value, or, in an ex-
treme case, dedicate it to the zoning municipality.
Although the court reached a logically consistent conclusion, it
does not necessarily follow that the holding in Agins is fair or just.
Every individual is expected to bear some loss as a result of the police
power for the good of the general whole,93 but is it reasonable that an
individual is required to bear a loss as great as that suffered by the
plaintiffs in Agins? Case authority in California, based on public policy
considerations, holds that such a burden is reasonable.94 Although the
imposition of such a burden may appear to be arbitrary when viewed
from the perspective of the individual landowner, the courts must look
to the welfare of the state as a whole rather than attempt to equalize
differences between an individual and the rest of the population.9 5 The
courts have ruled, in traditional police power fashion, in favor of "the
preservation of the public peace, safety, morals, .. health"96 and gen-
eral welfare.
The vast majority of cases in which plaintiffs seek relief in inverse
condemnation are those involving owner-developers holding land for
the purpose of later development. 97 Frustrated by a downzoning ordi-
nance that precludes development, the landowners seek damages in in-
verse condemnation, claiming that a loss of anticipated profits
93. "It is thoroughly established in this country that the rights preserved to the indi-
vidual. . . are held in subordination to the rights of society. Although one owns
property, he may not do with it as he pleases any more than he may act in accord-
ance with his personal desires. . . . [Incidental damages to property resulting
from governmental activities, or laws passed in the promotion of the public welfare
are not considered a taking of the property for which compensation must be
made."
Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 488, 234 P. 381, 385 (1925), appealdismissed,
273 U.S. 781 (1926) (quoting Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 153, 196 N.W. 451,453 (1923)).
94. See cases cited in the first paragraph of note 8 supra.
95. [P]roblems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and
will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation
of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and
validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are
now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably
would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sus-
tained, under the complex conditions of our day. . . .And in this there is no in-
consistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the
scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation.
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
96. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 485, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925).
97. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 511-12, 542 P.2d 237, 239-40,
125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 367-68 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) (land purchased with eye
toward construction of suburban shopping center); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal.
App. 3d 613, 621, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579 (1976) (contemplation of development of single-
family residences).
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constitutes a "taking" or "damaging." The courts and the legislatures
cannot, of course, deliberately act to deprive a specific individual of all
of his justly obtained profits; the fifth amendment is designed to pre-
vent such arbitrary actions.98 But courts have routinely held that "[a]
party has no vested interest in a previous zoning classification of his
property." 99 The California courts have concluded that a governmen-
tal entity acting under the police power for the protection of the public
welfare is not required to compensate individuals for the deprivation of
speculative interests. 100
Other policy considerations cited by the California Supreme Court
also support the holding in Agins. The first policy consideration relied
upon was the need to preserve natural resources. 10 In Agins, this issue
is of paramount concern. Land is a resource that cannot be replaced;
development must be undertaken thoughtfully, in consideration of its
impact on the environment. If the California Supreme Court had
reached the conclusion that inverse condemnation was an available
remedy in Agins, the policy of meaningful and effective land use regu-
lation might have become extremely difficult to implement.
This leads to a second policy consideration underlying the court's
decision: a public entity may simply be unable to afford the risk of
defending suits in inverse condemnation whenever it attempts to zone.
The courts refer to this as a "chilling effect."'1 2 The remedy of inverse
condemnation is often an expensive one. In Agins, the plaintiffs
claimed damages of $2,000,000;103 in HFH, the "taking" was alleged to
have cost the plaintiffs $325,000.14 The magnitude of these claims is
beyond the resources of many municipalities. If the remedy of inverse
condemnation were readily available, public entities would be required
to budget some of their resources for the costs of litigation or, more
probably, retreat from careful and enforceable land use planning. The
98. Professor Sax suggests that this was the original and only reason behind the fifth
amendment's adoption: "the clause was designed to prevent arbitrary government action,
rather than to preserve the status quo." Sax, supra note 7, at 57-59.
99. Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 79 Cal. App. 3d 439, 442, 144
Cal. Rptr. 776, 777 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 957 (1979).
100. E.g., HFH v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App.
2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967).
101. 24 Cal. 3d at 275, 598 P.2d at 29-30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77.
102. Id. at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377. "[T]he utilization of an inverse
condemnation remedy would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of police regulatory
powers at a local level because the expenditure of public funds would be, to some extent,
within the control of the judiciary." Id.
103. Id. at 271-72, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
104. 15 Cal. 3d at 512, 542 P.2d at 249, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
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promotion of the general welfare-the traditional objective of the po-
lice power-would effectively be curtailed by the costly demands of
individuals who feel their property has been "taken" by some form of
land use regulation.
A third policy consideration underlying the court's rationale is
found in the separate functions of government; courts have tradition-
ally deferred to the wisdom of the zoning municipality when faced with
a challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance:" 5
In deciding whether a challenged ordinance reasonably re-
lates to the public welfare, the courts recognize that such ordi-
nances are presumed to be constitutional, and come before
the court with every intendment in their favor. . . . "The
courts may differ with the zoning authorities as to the 'neces-
sity or the propriety of an enactment,' but so long as it re-
mains a 'question upon which reasonable minds may differ,'
there will be no judicial interference with the municipality's
determination of policy.""0 6
This viewpoint has been explicitly sanctioned by the United States
Supreme Court: "If the validity. . . be fairly debatable, the legislative
judgment must be allowed to control."'0 7
The dissent in Agins attempted to refute some of the arguments
advanced by the majority; the dissent argued that the Aginses should
have been allowed compensation for their loss.' 0 8 Justice Clark repeat-
edly emphasized the fact that the California Constitution requires pay-
ment for "damaging" as well as "taking" of private property, stating
that the land in Agins had been so "damaged."'' 0 9 In so arguing, how-
105. McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 885-86, 264 P.2d 932, 935
(1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954); Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453,
460-62, 202 P.2d 38, 42-43, cert. denied, 337 U.S. 939 (1949).
106. Associated Home Builders of the Greater E. Bay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.
3d 582, 604-05, 557 P.2d 473, 486, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 54 (1976) (citation omitted) (quoting
Clemons v. City of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.2d 95, 98, 222 P.2d 439, 441 (1950)).
107. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). The wisdom of the
legislature will not control, however, in determining how much compensation an individual
is due; that is a matter for the courts. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 327-28 (1893).
108. 24 Cal. 3d at 279-80, 598 P.2d at 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 379 (Clark, J. dissenting).
109. Id. Justice Clark noted that Tiburon had "what is already among the highest resi-
dential land values in the state." Id. As a result of the majority opinion,
Tiburon-and many other governmental agencies enacting similar land use
plans-will price properties within their control out of the reach of most people.
Only the most wealthy will be able to afford the purchase of and construction on
land in such areas. The environment which Tiburon seeks to preserve will dispro-
portionately benefit the wealthy landowner, whose home will be surrounded by
open space, unobstructed view and unpolluted atmosphere.
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ever, Justice Clark did not address the reasoning underlying the major-
ity opinion: if an ordinance takes or damages property without
compensation, the proper remedy is invalidation rather than inverse
condemnation." 0 The courts, of course, have recognized that an actual
"taking" or "damaging" in the physical sense is not required;"' op-
pressive pre-condemnation activity such as that complained of in .Klop-
ping v. City of Whittier"2 may also give rise to constitutionally
compensable damages." 3 The damage suffered in Agins, however, was
insufficient to meet California's constitutional requirements:
The Constitution does not . . . authorize a remedy for
every diminution in the value of property that is caused by a
public improvement [or regulation]. The damage for which
compensation is to be made is a damage to the property itself,
and does not include a mere infringement of the owner's per-
sonal pleasure or enjoyment. Merely rendering private prop-
erty less desirable for certain purposes. . . will not constitute
the damage contemplated by the Constitution; but the prop-
erty itself must suffer some diminution in substance, or be
rendered intrinsically less valuable by reason of the public
use. 114
The Agins' land was not so damaged and there was no taking for pub-
lic use. Its value merely dropped because of the adoption of the zoning
ordinance." 5 The main thrust of the dissent, then, is refuted by the
Id. at 283-84, 598 P.2d at 35, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (Clark, J., dissenting).
At first reading, Justice Clark's reasoning does carry some emotional appeal; however,
on closer analysis, the argument does not really hold up. As stated in the text, the proposed
remedy of compensation for downzoning primarily benefits the wealthy land speculator
against the interests of the surrounding community-more so than the remedies of the ma-
jority opinion. Under the main opinion, the land values of Tiburon could remain high, but
the surrounding community would not be forced to subsidize the speculative real estate
interests of wealthy individuals who might live there.
110. E.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10
Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973); McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach,
41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953), cer. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
111. "We are, of course, aware of the modem rule that a taking does not require a physi-
cal invasion or direct legal restraint, as an undue restriction may suffice." Dale v. City of
Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 109, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520, 524-25 (1976).
112. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972) (eminent domain action pre-
ceded by announcement of intent to condemn).
113. Id.
114. Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 482, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162, 169-70
(1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
115. The dissent, somewhat wistfully, looked for support in the recent United States
Supreme Court decision, Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
440 U.S. 391 (1979). That case involved a fact situation almost identical to that of Sierra
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analysis of the cases supporting the majority opinion: inverse condem-
nation is not an appropriate remedy in a challenge to a zoning ordi-
nance, and the property in question was not "taken" or "damaged"
within the meaning of the California Constitution.'
1 6
C The Validity of the Zoning Regulation
The only remedy left to the plaintiffs in Agins under the majority
opinion was invalidation of the ordinance. The California Supreme
Court, however, dashed these last hopes. It stated that a balancing test
must be applied in determining the validity of a zoning ordinance.'
17
This test weighs the public purpose underlying the regulation against a
landowner's right to the free use of his property." 8 The court desig-
nated the outer limits of the constitutional application of the police
power in land use control when it held that "a zoning ordinance may
be unconstitutional and subject to invalidation only when its effect is to
deprive the landowner of substantially all reasonable use of his prop-
erty."''119 Noting that, on the face of the ordinance, the plaintiffs still
had the legal ability to build on their property, the court ruled that
Tiburon's Ordinance No. 124 N.S. was valid and that plaintiffs had no
Terreno v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 79 Cal. App. 3d 439, 144 Cal. Rptr. 776
(1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 957 (1979), except that Lake Country Estates was fied in fed-
eral court. The defendant planning agency raised the barrier of the eleventh amendment of
the United States Constitution, which states that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI. Since the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(TRPA) was a bi-state agency, composed of officials from both California and. Nevada, the
plaintiffs in Lake Country Estates were suing a state agency, raising the question whether
TRPA was immune from suit under the eleventh amendment. The Court held that TRPA
was not immune from suit. Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440
U.S. at 402 (1979). The Court also found, however, that the individual members of TRPA
were immune because they were acting in a legislative capacity. Id. at 405.
In his Agins dissent, Justice Clark acknowledged the limited holding in Lake Country
Estates but also added that "the sense of the holding is that an action in inverse condemna-
tion lies for a taking brought about by land use regulation of the very nature involved in the
instant case." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d at 283, 598 P.2d at 35, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
382. This is not true. The United States Supreme Court did not decide whether inverse
condemnation was a proper remedy for the plaintiffs in Lake Country Estates; it merely
assumed that such was the case for the purposes of its decision. "Because none of the
respondents filed a cross-petition for certiorari, we have no occasion to review the Court of
Appeals' additional holding that a violation of the Due Process Clause was adequately al-
leged. For purposes of our decision, we assume the sufficiency of those allegations." 404
U.S. at 397.
116. See note 86 supra.
117. 24 Cal. 3d at 277, 598 P.2d at 34, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
118. Id. at 274, 598 P.2d at 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
119. Id. at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
cause of action against the city. 120
The effect of the court's ruling in Agins is that only in rare situa-
tions in California will an action for declaratory relief be valid:
(1) "zoning classifications invoked in order to evade the requirement
that land used by the public must be acquired in eminent domain pro-
ceedings;"' 2 1 (2) inequitable zoning actions undertaken by a public
agency as a prelude to public acquisition; 122 and (3) "spot zoning"
cases constituting an undue burden on the downzoned land in light of
uses allowed in the surrounding area. 23 The Agins court did not find
any of these exceptions present: there were no allegations of actual
public use of the land or inequitable spot zoning. 24
The plaintiffs in Agins, however, alleged that Tiburon's aban-
doned eminent domain action was intended to depress the value of
their property. 25  They advanced their claim under the holding of
Klopping v. City of Whittier,'26 which allowed damages in inverse con-
demnation because of a city's oppressive pre-condemnation activi-
ties.'27 The court did not find "persuasive" the plaintiffs' reliance on
Miopping, stating that Agins was not a case falling into the Klopping
fact pattern;128 rather, Agins was more like Selby v. City of San
120. Id.
121. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 517 n.14, 542 P.2d 237, 243 n.14, 125
Cal. Rptr. 365, 371 n.14 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) (emphasis in original). See,
e.g., Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963). Sneed
involved a parcel of land adjacent to a publicly owned airport; the zoning municipality
passed a regulation creating a height restriction and effectively taking an air navigation ease-
ment over plaintiffs property.
122. See, e.g., Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391
(1969) (property in question was zoned with a height restriction intended to depress plain-
tif's property value in anticipation of the acquisition of the land for a municipal airport).
123. "Spot zoning occurs where a small parcel is restricted and given lesser rights than the
surrounding property, as where a lot in the center of a business or commercial district is
limited to uses for residential purposes thereby creating an "island" in the middle of a larger
area devoted to other uses." Viso v. State, 92 Cal. App. 3d 15, 22, 154 Cal. Rptr. 580, 584-85
(1979) (citations omitted). See also Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31
Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963); Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 472-73, 202 P.2d 38,
49-50 (Carter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 939 (1949); Wilkins v. City of San Ber-
nardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 175 P.2d 542 (1946); Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal. 2d 244, 83 P.2d 29
(1938).
124. 24 Cal. 3d at 270-72, 598 P.2d at 26-28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 373-75. The determination
of whether an entity acts "reasonably" is usually a matter decided by the courts. Here the
court ruled that Tiburon had acted properly. Id.
125. Id. at 277-78, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
126. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
127. Id. at 51-52, 500 P.2d at 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
128. 24 Cal. 3d at 277-78, 598 P.2d at 31-32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
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Buenaventura,129 which held that a public entity's adoption of a general
plan did not amount to a "taking."' 30 The Agins court held, without
explanation, that Tiburon did not act unfairly and therefore the plain-
tiffs had no valid claim for damages.
31
By so holding, the California Supreme Court circumvented the
Klopping argument advanced by the plaintiffs. The Aginses did not
complain specifically about the adoption of Tiburon's ordinance as
much as about the activities that surrounded it-the studies leading to
a recommendation of using the land as open space and the city's filing
and abandonment of an eminent domain action.' 32 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the city's actions, taken as a whole, constituted oppressive
conduct, which caused the value of their property to decline.
It is unclear whether the Aginses were entitled to damages under
the holding of Klopping, because that decision did not articulate the
elements that must be proved by a plaintiff in order to establish a tak-
ing.' 33 It appears that the decisive factor in Klopping was Whittier's
abandonment of an eminent domain action with the announcement
that it fully intended to acquire the land if certain difficulties were
worked out.1
3 4
Decisions after Kopping have only partially clarified this confu-
sion. Another California Supreme Court decision, Jones v. Department
of Transportation, 35 also failed to specify which facts led the court to
conclude that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages as a result of the
Department of Transportation's pre-condemnation activities. 36 One
factor that distinguished Jones from Klopping, however, was that Jones
involved a condemnation announcement on the part of the state
agency.137 Apparently, based on the facts in Jones, mere uncooperative
conduct on the part of a public entity is enough to give rise to inverse
condemnation damages under the rationale of Klopping.
The California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District,
129. 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
130. Id. at 121, 514 P.2d at 118, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
131. 24 Cal. 3d at 277-78, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
132. Id.
133. 8 Cal. 3d at 52, 500 P.2d at 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
134. Id. at 53, 500 P.2d at 1355-56, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11-12.
135. 22 Cal. 3d 144, 583 P.2d 165, 148 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1978).
136. Id. In Jones, the plaintiffs bought a parcel of land for subdivision purposes. Their
plans were thwarted by the proposed development of a freeway next to the land, cutting off
access to the land. For nearly ten years plaintiffs tried to sell the land or work out an agree-
ment with the state; however, the Department of Transportation was consistently uncooper-
ative.
137. Id. at 151, 583 P.2d at 167, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
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in Department of Public Works v. Peninsula Enterprises, Inc.,3 formu-
lated a general rule for determining the applicability of Klopping dam-
ages. The court in Peninsula Enterprises stated that the award of such
damages "depends upon whether the conduct of the public agency in
question has evolved to the point where its announcements result in a
special and direct interference with the owner's property; the wide-
spread impact resulting from mere general planning is noncompensa-
ble.,,139
In Agins, the eminent domain action was eventually abandoned.
Tiburon, unlike the City of Whittier in Klopping, did not announce any
further intent to acquire the Agins' land. The zoning ordinance had
already been implemented before the eminent domain action was
filed.'4 ° Agins differs, therefore, from Klopping and Jones in that those
cases did not involve the adoption of a zoning ordinance prior to the
offending pre-condemnation activity. Given the vagueness of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decisions in this area, perhaps the best method
of determining whether the pre-condemnation activity in Agins falls
into a Klopping fact pattern is to use the test of Peninsula Enterprises:
did the actions of Tiburon create "a special and direct interference"'
14 1
with the owners' property? The plaintiffs inAgins cannot develop their
land as they had originally planned and cannot sell it for its pre-ordi-
nance value. But this is not a "special" and "direct" interference as in
Klopping in which the city put a cloud over the plaintiff's property with
its announcement that it intended to acquire the property through con-
demnation.142 The plaintiffs in Agins are under no such threat. Nor is
the fact situation completely analogous to Jones. In Jones, the plain-
tiffs attempted a compromise with the public entity so that plaintiffs
could retain use of their land.143 In Agins, the plaintiffs did not attempt
to compromise. After the abandonment of the eminent domain action,
the Agins filed a claim in inverse condemnation against Tiburon. 44 It
appears from the facts given that Tiburon did not act "unreasonably"
as the term is used in Klopping.
138. 91 Cal. App. 3d 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1979).
139. Id. at 344, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
140. 24 Cal. 3d at 271, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
141. Department of Public Works v. Peninsula Enterprises, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 3d at 355,
153 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
142. 8 Cal. 3d at 54, 500 P.2d at 1357, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
143. 22 Cal. 3d at 149-50, 583 P.2d at 168, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
144. 24 Cal. 3d at 271-72, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
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III. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court could have used Agins as a vehicle
to issue a definitive statement on land use control in California. Unfor-
tunately, the decision will not have this effect. The court circumvented
the real issue in Agins by failing to define adequately what constitutes
an abuse of the police power or what actions constitute a "taking." It is
clear, however, that Agins will render a successful pleading in inverse
condemnation against a zoning public entity extremely rare in Califor-
nia state courts. Some final resolution of this controversy is needed: it
is an issue ripe for adjudication by the United States Supreme Court.
Until the Supreme Court makes such a decision, however, the rule
of Agins is the law of the State of California. At first glance, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's conclusions in Agins may appear unduly harsh
as the Aginses have been financially injured and left without a remedy
against the city that deprived them of the ability to develop their prop-
erty as they had planned. The concept of private property, however, is
one created .by the law. Therefore, it is inevitable that as the law
changes so will the acceptable parameters of private ownership of land.
The needs of society in general must be weighed against the rights of
the private individual. The balancing of these opposing concepts nec-
essarily means that both parties will ultimately lose something in the
resulting compromise. In California, where the lesson that use of the
land must be planned in an equitable manner has been more clearly
demonstrated than anywhere else, land use controls are especially im-
portant. The California Supreme Court's decision in Agins is an appli-
cation of the widely accepted public policy consideration that the
beauty of our state must be preserved. Agins indicates that the court
will not interfere with a legislative implementation of that policy unless
a landowner is deprived of all his property rights.
Jan E Copley
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